In this paper authorization-limited transformation-free proxy cryptosystems (AL-TFP systems) are studied. It is a modification of the original proxy cryptosystem introduced by Mambo et al. [8] in which a ciphertext transformation by the original decryptor is necessary, and also a modification of the delegated decryption system proposed by Mu et al. [10] . In both systems proposed in [8] and [10], the original decryptors have to trust their proxies completely. The AL-TFP system allows the proxy decryptor to do decryption directly without any ciphertext transformation from the original decryptor, so that it can release the original decryptor more efficiently from a large amount of decrypting operations. Moreover, the original decryptor's privacy can be protected efficiently because the authority of proxy decryptor is limited to his duty and valid period. An active identity-based and a directory-based AL-TFP systems from pairings are proposed. Furthermore, an application of directory-based AL-TFP system to electronic commerce is also described. The securities of our schemes introduced are based on the BDH assumption.
Introduction

Motivation
As is well known, until the emergence of electronic commerce, the use of cryptographic-based technologies was essentially limited to the national security arena and a limited set of banking applications. Electronic commerce has raised many new questions and issues regarding the deployment of cryptographic and related information security technologies on a large scale.
In this paper, we consider how to release people of managerial class, say, a CEO of some company, from his heavy office work by partially delegating his decryption power to his secretaries. It is in fact a research work about proxy cryptosystem, which was introduced by Mambo and * A preliminary version was presented at InfoSecu'04 [13] . a) E-mail: wlh@cipher.risk.tsukuba.ac.jp b) E-mail: zfcao@cs.sjtu.edu.cn c) E-mail: ken@risk.tsukuba.ac.jp d) E-mail: miao@risk.tsukuba.ac.jp e) E-mail: okamoto@risk.tsukuba.ac.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a. 1.106 Okamoto in [8] . In a proxy cryptosystem, there are three participants involved: encryptor Alice, original decryptor Bob and Bob's proxy Charlie.
Related Works
Proxy signature schemes were introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto [9] in 1996 for the delegation of the power to sign messages. One year later, proxy cryptosystems, say Mambo-Okamoto proxy cryptosystems, were also invented by Mambo and Okamoto [8] for the delegation of the power to decrypt ciphertexts. In Mambo-Okamoto proxy cryptosystems, Alice encrypts a plaintext and transmits its ciphertext to Bob. In a conventional proxy cryptosystem, after a transformation of the ciphertext into another ciphertext, Bob forwards the new ciphertext to Charlie, his proxy decryptor, to recover the plaintext. More precisely, the protocol consists of the following steps:
(1) Proxy Generation, Delivery and Verification: Bob generates a proxy key and delivers it to Charlie in a secure way, and Charlie verifies the validity of the proxy key. Instead of decrypting the ciphertext received from Alice, Bob makes the ciphertext transformation for Charlie. Though compared with consecutive processing of decryption and re-encryption, Bob's computational work is reduced to a certain extent, Bob can not be really released from his heavy work because he has to transform the ciphertext into another ciphertext before Charlie works every time. In Mambo-Okamoto proxy cryptosystems the amounts of computational work needed in the decryption and in the ciphertext transformation are almost the same.
In 1999, Mu et al. [10] proposed a proxy (delegated) decryption system called MVN proxy cryptosystem. In MVN proxy cryptosystem, the proxy decryptor Charlie can decrypt the ciphertext without any ciphertext transformation from the original decryptor Bob. However, both Mambo- Okamoto proxy cryptosystem and MVN proxy cryptosystem have a shortcoming that the original decryptor has to trust his proxy completely, because that the proxy decryptors can decrypt the whole ciphertext he received.
In fact, in the real world, it is impossible for a person to trust others completely forever. Therefore, how to release a managerial staff from his heavy work but at the same time protect his privacy from his proxy is a problem of not only theoretical but also practical significance.
Our Contribution
In order to overcome the above two shortcomings of proxy cryptosystems developed so far, we propose a new proxy cryptosystem without transformation in the following way (see Fig. 1 Such a proxy cryptosystem is called in this paper authorization-limited transformation-free proxy cryptosystem, or briefly AL-TFP system.
Definition 1:
A proxy cryptosystem is called an authorization-limited transformation-free proxy cryptosystem (AL-TFP system) if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) Transformation-Free: On receipt of a ciphertext C corresponding to a plaintext M for an original decryptor say Bob, a proxy decryptor say Charlie, who has obtained the proxy key from Bob, can do the proxy decryption of C in part by an efficient algorithm without any ciphertext transformation from Bob. (2) Authorization-Limited: Charlie can decrypt part of C, while Bob can decrypt C completely. Bob can delegate the authority to Charlie to decrypt part of C for a validity period according to the effective term of the proxy key.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we recap some definitions and difficult mathematical problems. In Sect. 3, we first provide the formal definition of an AL-TFP system, then propose two concrete AL-TFP systems, one of which being an active identity-based (IDbased) system, and the other being a directory-based (DIRbased) system, and finally describe an application of DIRbased AL-TFP system to electronic commerce by introducing the partial decryption-verification model. Concluding remarks are given in Sect. 4.
Preliminaries
In this paper, we realize AL-TFP system by Boneh and Franklin's method, namely, using bilinear maps between groups [1] . In [1] , Boneh and Franklin used a bilinear pairing, called modified Weil pairing associated with supersingular elliptic curves to achieve a solution to Shamir's identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [12] . Since cryptosystems based on pairing were introduced by Sakai et al. [11] in 2000, pairings have played a key role in designing various cryptosystems such as IBE schemes [1] , short signature schemes [2] , ID-based signature schemes [6] , and more scalable trust authorities using certification of public keys within an identity based system [3] .
Pairings
Now we briefly recall some basic concepts and properties related to bilinear maps between groups.
Let G 1 be an additive group and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same large prime order q. We assume that the discrete logarithm problems in both G 1 and G 2 are hard. Similar to Sakai et al. [11] and Boneh et al.'s IBE systems [1] , our protocol can be built from any bilinear map e :
is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following three properties:
(2) Nondegenerate. Ifê(P, Q) = 1 for all Q ∈ G 1 then P = ∞, and also ifê(P, Q) = 1 for all P ∈ G 1 then Q = ∞, where ∞ is the identity of G 1 . (3) Computable. There is an efficient algorithm to computê e(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
We note that the Weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves or abelian varieties can be modified to create such bilinear maps. Similar to [1] , the modified Weil pairing will be adopt in this paper for the convenience of description, although using the Tate pairing would be more efficient [7] .
The Weil pairing e is a bilinear map between the group [14] ) that there is a point P ∈ E(F p )[q] of order q. Then we can define G 1 to be the cyclic subgroup P of order q, and G 2 to be the cyclic subgroup of F * p n of order q. The Weil pairing is degenerate on G 1 since e(P, P) = 1. Letê : G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 denote the corresponding modified Weil pairing (see Sect. 5.1 of [1] or Sect. 6.8 of [14] ) which satisfies the nondegenerate property.
Problems for Security Consideration
Definition 2: The BDH problem and the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem are defined as follows:
• The BDH problem in G 1 , G 2 ,ê :
• The CDH problem -in the additive cyclic group G 1 of order q: Given P, aP, bP for some a, b ∈ Z q \ {0} where P is a generator of G 1 , compute abP ∈ G 1 . -in the multiplicative cyclic group G 2 of order q:
Lemma 1: ([1], [7] ) The BDH problem G 1 , G 2 ,ê is no harder than the CDH problem in G 1 or G 2 , and the CDH problem in G i is no harder than the discrete logarithm problem in G i , i = 1, 2.
Definition 3 (BDH Assumption):
We assume that the BDH problem is hard in G 1 , G 2 ,ê , which means that there is no efficient algorithm to solve the BDH problem with nonnegligible probability.
Let S uc BDH (P, aP, bP, cP) denote the event that the BDH problem in G 1 , G 2 ,ê is solved, that is, if P, aP, bP, cP for some a, b, c ∈ Z q \ {0} are known where P is a generator of G 1 , thenê(P, P) abc ∈ G 2 can be computed. Therefore, according to the BDH assumption, the probability
is negligible in our schemes.
As usual, we say that a function g : R → R is a negligible if g(k) is smaller than 1/ f (k) for any polynomial f .
Our AL-TFP Systems
In this section, we give the formal definition of an AL-TFP system, provide our AL-TFP systems in detail, and describe an application to electronic commerce.
Definitions
Clearly, in an AL-TFP system, there is no need for Bob to transform the ciphertext from Alice into another ciphertext for Charlie, and the proxy Charlie holds is terminable. We give the formal definition of AL-TFP system as follows.
Definition 4 (AL-TFP system): An AL-TFP system (G, PA, E, D, Random, Mspace) is a 4-tuple of algorithms associated with two finite sets, Random(k), Mspace(k) ⊆ {0, 1} * , for k ∈ N, where: -G, called the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm which on input 1 k outputs a public/private key pair (pk, sk) ← G(1 k ). -PA, called the proxy-authorization algorithm, is an algorithm which on input a private key sk and subject/valid stamps stamps, which is designated by the original decryptor, outputs a corresponding proxy key sk per ← PA(sk, stamps).
a probabilistic algorithm which on input a public key pk, a plaintext x ← Mspace(k) and a random number r ← Random(k), outputs the ciphertexts y = E(pk; x; r) where
, called the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which consists of a proxy decryption algorithm D per and an original decryption algorithm D cen , which on input a private key sk and a ciphertext y outputs the corresponding plaintext x ← D(sk; y), where
Definition 5 (BasCrypt and BasProx):
The corresponding 3-tuples of algorithms BasCrypt = (G, E cen , D cen ) and BasProx = (G, E per , D per ) are called the basic cryptosystem scheme and the basic proxy decryption scheme associated with the two finite sets Random(k), Mspace(k), respectively. BasCrypt is said to be semantically secure if the advantage for any polynomial time adversary A BasC is negligible. Similarly, BasProx is said to be semantically secure if the advantage for any polynomial time adversary A BasP is negligible (see Appendix Definition 8 for more details).
Definition 6: Let A P A denote a polynomial time adversary to forge a valid proxy key without original decryptor's any private information. The proxy-authorization algorithm PA is said to be secure if the success probability
is negligible, where stamps ( stamps) is selected by the adversary A P A and sk per is a valid proxy key forged by A P A corresponding to stamps . According to the above definition, we give the following definition of security under the assumption that the algorithm PA is secure.
Definition 7 (Secure AL-TFP scheme): An AL-TFP scheme with a secure proxy-authorization algorithm PA is called secure if both the BasCrypt and BasProx are secure.
Active ID-Based AL-TFP System
The general idea of ID-based cryptosystems was formulated by Shamir [12] in 1984, in which users' identities were employed in place of public keys. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [1] proposed an ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme based on weil pairings between groups. Their scheme assumed the existence of some TA to generate private key for each user, which can be closed after all private keys are issued.
In our active ID-based AL-TFP system, however, we require the TA to be always open for users to generate and distribute proxy keys. With the aid of the TA, from his own private key S i , user i can derive private keys with some stamps as his proxy keys. These proxy keys may vary according to different stamps, although the private key S i of user i remains fixed. We use some bilinear map between groups in our active ID-based AL-TFP system. Our system consists of the steps Key Generation, ProxyAuthorization, Encryption, and Decryption.
Protocol
We describe our active ID-based AL-TFP system in detail. Key Generation: For given security parameters k, l ∈ N, some TA generates the public system parameters
by running a BDH parameter generator with q = O(2 k ) (see [1] ), choosing two cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * −→ G 1 and H 2 : G 2 −→ {0, 1} l , secretly selecting s ∈ R Z q \ {0} and computing R = sP. Upon request, the TA generates and delivers the private key S i = sH 1 (ID i ) to user i with identity ID i . Proxy-Authorization: From his private key S i , user i derive proxy keys at will with some stamps such as S ub ject stamp and Validity stamp, where S ub ject is the subject delegated to the proxy decryptor, and Validity is the validity period.
( Charlie verifies the validity of the proxy key X per according to the following equality: H 1 (ID B ||S tamps) ). 
If it holds, then Charlie accepts
where U = rP, and r ∈ R Z q \ {0} is secretly chosen by Alice. Alice sends the ciphertext (U, µ) to Bob. Decryption: Charlie decrypts (U, µ per ) as follows:
and then submits the ciphertext (U, µ cen ) to Bob if necessary. Bob decrypts (U, µ cen ) as follows: , S B ) ).
Security Analysis
Theorem 1: In the proposed ID-based AL-TFP system, the proxy decryptor can efficiently decrypt the ciphertext (U, µ per ) to the plaintext m per , and the original decryptor can efficiently decrypt the ciphertext (U, µ cen ) to the plaintext m cen .
Proof: During encryption m per is XORed with
while during proxy decryption µ per is XORed with
These masks are in fact the same, as the following shows: That is, the CDH problem is solved out, which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, the PA-Answering step is secure.
(3) Transforming: In PA-Transforming, because we have employed a secure channel, the forging attack here is infeasible.
In this way, the proof is completed.
Lemma 3:
In our active ID-based AL-TFP system, the BasCrypt and the BasProx are similar to the IBE scheme in [1] , which had been proved [1] semantically secure against chosen plaintext attack in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption.
Proof:
The algorithms E and D in the BasCrypt and the BasProx of our active ID-based AL-TFP system are similar to the IBE scheme in [1] , which is secure against chosen plaintext attack in the random oracle model (see Appendix Lemma 4).
Theorem 2:
Our active ID-based AL-TFP system is secure against chosen plaintext attack in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption.
Proof: Theorem 2 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Remark:
The BasCrypt and the BasProxy in our active AL-TFP system are secure against chosen plaintext attack but not secure against chosen ciphertext attack. However, using the technical method (refer to Appendix Definition 9) described in [4] , our scheme can be easily modified to a scheme which has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption (refer to Appendix Lemma 5).
In the proxy authorization (PA) phase of an active IDbased system, by the aid of some TA, Bob computes the proxy key(s) from his private key S B for his proxy decryptor(s) without changing his private key S B and his public key H 1 (ID B ). This makes the communication between the transmitter Alice and the receiver Bob quite convenient. Furthermore, in an active ID-based AL-TFP system, the proxy decryptor Charlie can do the decryption without any ciphertext transformation. However, in an active ID-based AL-TFP system, users must trust the TA absolutely. The TA is the only entity who knows the system secret s, and the TA can decrypt any ciphertext from any user whose private key is issued by this TA. When Alice and Bob are working for the same company, the company president may be the best person for the TA.
DIR-Based AL-TFP System
Our DIR-based AL-TFP system is in fact a proxy public key cryptosystem, therefore a certification authority (CA) is necessary. The system parameters P DIR should be made known to the public, but every personal public/private key pair should be generated by every user himself. The public key should be certificated by the CA and registered in a directory. The transmitter should obtain the receiver's public key and its certificate before transmitting any message.
Protocol
Now we give a detailed description of our DIR-based AL-TFP system. Key Generation: The public system parameters
where φ : G 1 −→ G 1 is a one-way function, and the other parameters have the same meaning as those described in the previous subsection. Using P DIR , user i runs the following steps to generate his personal public/private key pair:
(1) Select two random numbers s i , t i independently. (2) Compute R i = s i P, T i = t i φ(R i ) to obtain his public/private key pair ((R i , T i ), (s i , t i )). (3) Register his public key (R i , T i ) into the DIR-based AL-TFP system and obtain a certificate from a CA for his public key.
Proxy-Authorization:
User i computes the proxy key X per = t i H 1 (S tamps) and gives it to the proxy decryptor in a secure way. On receipt of the proxy key, Charlie verifies its validity according to the following equality:
If the equality holds, then Charlie accepts it as a valid proxy. Encryption: When Alice wishes to transmit some plaintext M = (m per , m cen ) to Bob, she first obtains Bob's public key (R B , T B ) with its certificate from the CA, and then encrypts the plaintext as follows:
(1) Calculate
where r ∈ R Z q \ {0} is secretly chosen by Alice. (2) Encrypt 
Similar to the active ID-based AL-TFP system, the DIR-based AL-TFP system is also a proxy cryptosystem without ciphertext transformation. Moreover, Bob can generate different proxy keys for different proxy decryptors by changing the stamps with the same private key t B .
Security Analysis
Theorem 3: In the proposed DIR-based AL-TFP system, the proxy decryptor can efficiently decrypt the ciphertext (V, µ per ) to the plaintext m per , and the original decryptor can efficiently decrypt the ciphertext (U, µ cen ) to the plaintext m cen .
Proof: It can be easily proved in a way similar to that of Theorem 1.
Next, we briefly discuss the security of the DIR-based AL-TFP system.
In the steps Key Generation and Proxy-Authorization, Bob generates his personal public/private key pair and the proxy key. It is easy to see that it is a discrete logarithm problem in G 1 to obtain the private keys s B and t B from R B and T B respectively. Other people cannot compute X per or create a new proxy key because H 1 is a secure hash function, φ is a one-way function, and the CDH problem in G 1 is assumed to be hard. Charlie can not forge any proxy key either for the same reasons. Just like the active ID-based AL-TFP system, the adopted Encryption and Decryption in our DIR-based AL-TFP system are similar to those described in [1] , which have chosen plaintext security in the random oracle model assuming that the BDH problem is hard. 
An Application to Electronic Commerce
In this section, we describe an application of our AL-TFP systems to electronic commerce. We consider how to release the managerial staff from his heavy office work by partially delegating his decryption power to his secretaries.
Partial Decryption-Verification Model
In the partial delegation-verification (PDV) model (see Fig. 2 ), Alice should divide the plaintext M into the peripheral part m per which can be read by both Bob and his secretary Charlie, and the central part m cen which is only for Bob, if it is necessary, and then encrypt M = (m per , m cen ) to the ciphertext µ = (µ per , µ cen ). She transmits M to Bob, the president of a company, and Charlie, Bob's secretary, directly decrypts the encrypted peripheral part of the message µ per , and then verifies Alice's identity. If Alice's identity cannot be verified, Charlie rejects the entire message sent to Bob by Alice, otherwise, handles those matters within his purview and then, if it is necessary, submits to Bob the encrypted central part of message µ cen which he is not able to decrypt. In this model, She should decide by herself which is peripheral part and which is central part of the message; (3) Charlie is able to decrypt the peripheral message and handle the business affairs described in the peripheral message.
Assume that the time stamp in S tamps of the AL-TFP system is MonthYear. Then Bob can change his secretary at the beginning of every month, and the power of proxy will be discontinued automatically at the end of every month. Bob's secretary can be Charlie this month, and Clara the next month, as long as Bob renews the proxy key for his secretary every month, while his public key and private key remain the same. Bob can employ more secretaries by adding more independent variables to S tamps.
In most cases, Alice and Bob do not work for the same company. We perform the PDV model by our DIR-based AL-TFP system, and the signature method is a slight modification of that used by Hess [6] . The public system parameters
is a hash function. The process consists of the following four steps: Key Generation and Proxy-Authorization: They are the same as the key generation and proxy-authorization in the DIR-based AL-TFP system. Signcryption: Alice does the following:
where r ∈ R Z q \ {0} is secretly chosen by Alice. (2) Encrypt
(4) Send (U, V, W, v, µ) to Bob.
Decryption-Verification:
Charlie does the following:
(1) Decrypt µ per :
Handle the matters about the message m per and submit the ciphertext (U, µ cen ) to Bob, if the final equality holds.
On receipt of the forwarded ciphertext (U, µ cen ), Bob decrypts µ cen :
We only give a brief discussion about the PDV scheme. In the step Signcryption, Alice signs the peripheral plaintext m per instead of its encryption µ per . Therefore, the adversary is unable to verify and forge Alice's signature S ign since he is unable to find m per . As described in Sect. 3.2, the adversary can not obtain the proxy key X per . Bob and Charlie can decrypt the encryption of the peripheral plaintext by the proxy key X per , but they can not forge Alice's signature either, because they do not know the random number r used in the signature which is also used in the encryption of the peripheral and central plaintexts. Obtaining r from U or V is a discrete logarithm problem in G 1 , and obtaining r from u,ê(V, X per ), orê(U, s B φ(R B )) is a discrete logarithm problem in G 2 . The adopted signature is similar to that used by Hess [6] , the security of which relies on the BDH problem in the random oracle model assuming that the BDH problem is hard.
Our PDV scheme might look like Boneh and Franklin's IBE system [1] . However, in Boneh and Franklin's IBE system, Bob completely trusts his secretaries, so that Alice does not need to divide the message into the peripheral part and the central part. Meanwhile, since their system is an IDbased system, a TA who knows the unique secret parameter s of the system is necessary. But in our PDV scheme, the important message between Alice and Bob is protected successfully by restricting Charlie's proxy power. Also, our scheme is DIR-based and the secret parameters {s i } as the private keys of users are generated by users themselves respectively, thus we need a CA. Our scheme is also different from Mambo and Okamoto's system [9] . In our AL-TFP systems, without any ciphertext transformation, Charlie can directly deal with decrypting operation with the proxy key. It releases Bob from the great amount of decryption work more efficiently than the proxy cryptosystem with transformation does.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigated the authorization-limited transformation-free proxy cryptosystem (AL-TFP system), which is an improvement of the proxy cryptosystem introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [8] in 1997 and the delegated decryption system proposed by Mu et al. [10] in 1999 (see Table 1 ). Mambo and Okamoto's proxy cryptosystem is a proxy cryptosystem with ciphertext transformation from the original decryptor. The AL-TFP system allows proxy decryptor to do decryption without any ciphertext transformation from the original decryptor, so that it can release the original decryptor more efficiently from large amounts of decrypting operations. Our AL-TFP system is different from the application of Boneh and Franklin's IBE system [1] in delegation of duties in the ways that the original decryptor does not have to completely trust the proxy decryptor(s), and no CA is required. Due to the limited authorization, the AL-TFP system not only has the same advantage as the delegation of duties by IBE does, such as multiple proxy decryptions and authorization with validity period, but also can overcome some weakness of the delegation of duties by IBE in grading the message into two secrecy levels so that the important message between the transmitter and the original decryptor can be protected successfully by restricting the proxy decryptor's power. In the PDV model in electronic commerce, the proxy decryptor can do the verification operation for the original decryptor besides proxy decryption.
Brief security analyses are also provided for all the systems we proposed.
